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Abstract: Tackling climate change is one of the most demanding chal-
lenges of humanity in the 21st century. Still, the efforts to mitigate the 
current environmental crisis do not seem enough to deal with the increased 
existential risks for the human and other species. Persson and Savulescu 
have proposed that our evolutionarily forged moral psychology is one of 
the impediments to facing as enormous a problem as global warming. 
They suggested that if we want to address properly some of the most 
pressing problems that cause catastrophic harm to our existence, we should 
enhance our moral behavior by biomedical means. The objective of this 
paper is, precisely, to reflect on whether a Moral Bio-Enhancement 
(henceforth MBE) program would be a viable option to confront the 
climate emergency. To meet this goal, I will propose the Ultimate Mos-
tropic (hereafter UM) thought experiment, a hypothetical situation where 
we have already discovered the UM, an available, safe (without any del-
eterious secondary effects), extremely cheap and effective pill to enhance 
our cognitive, affective and motivational abilities related to morality. 
After briefly presenting the main argument of Persson and Savulescu 
regarding MBE and climate change, I will point out some of the difficul-
ties that make MBE a daunting but exciting philosophical and scientific 
debate. In order to overcome these complications, I will describe the UM 
thought experiment, which involves two scenarios of the MBE program: 
(a) the state-driven, compulsory and universal enterprise, and (b) the 
initiative of voluntary individuals. I will show that the shortcomings of 
MBE programs through the UM in both scenarios make Persson and 
Ramon Llull Journal_11.indd   277 4/5/20   13:57
278 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2020. ISSUE 11 PP. 277-303
Savulescu’s proposal a not appealing pathway to mitigate climate change. 
In the final section, I will suggest that an inaccurate attribution of respon-
sibilities underlies their proposal and that the collective inaction problem 
should be redirected primarily through a reinforcement of the political 
nature of the solutions. 
Keywords: Moral enhancement, climate change, global warming, 
human enhancement, ethics, moral philosophy, consequentialism.
1.  INTRODUCTION: THE PROPOSAL OF PERSSON 
AND SAVULESCU
Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 
2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, and Savulescu 
& Persson, 2012) have defended on multiple occasions the ethical neces-
sity to enhance the moral character of humankind. The core idea behind 
the argument of this academic tandem is that there is an obvious mismatch 
between our moral psychology resulting from evolution and the moral 
challenges raised by the developments of our techno-scientifically advanced 
societies. The power amassed by our civilizations might wreak havoc at 
a global level, causing irreversible and catastrophic harms to humanity, 
to other species that inhabit the Earth and to the world’s ecosystems in 
general. 
In Unfit for the Future (2012), Persson and Savulescu extensively 
explain the concern that human moral psychology is not prepared for 
many of the great global challenges of the 21st century. Many of our 
moral dispositions were engraved evolutionarily in our brains when hu-
man beings lived in small communities, which makes us “ill-equipped” 
(2012:12) to face global and distant issues in space and time. Persson and 
Savulescu are concerned about existential risks for humanity: those that 
could unleash a catastrophic “Ultimate Harm” that could make the con-
tinuance of worthwhile life on planet Earth impossible (2012:46). They 
consider phenomena such as climate change, wars, mass destruction 
weapons, and (bio)terrorism, but in this article I will only focus on climate 
change. 
Persson and Savulescu point out empirically grounded obstacles that 
hinder the articulation of a collective agency against these types of prob-
lems. On the one hand, the human being tends to a parochial altruism, 
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creating a predisposition to focus on ingroup members, so that the degree 
of concern decreases as the spatial and emotional closeness is lower 
(2012:83). On the other hand, they consider that the bias towards the 
near future is even more worrisome (2012:27). The unpleasant events 
that seem temporally close affect us much more than those that seem 
more distant in the future, even if they are less important. The postpone-
ment of problems to a more distant future leads to personal and collective 
inaction. Another element to take into account is the common causality-
based morality, which makes us feel much more responsible for our 
actions than for our omissions. In addition, the co-responsibility implied 
by a collective agency dilutes individual responsibilities in the collective 
enterprise, which may lead to the underestimation of one’s responsibility 
and disillusionment due to dependence on others (2012:24).
Both authors note that the technological and cultural evolution of our 
societies has not matched that of our moral psychology, which evolved 
in small and close-knit communities. Human living conditions have 
changed radically, we live mainly in large populations, we have introduced 
enormous technological changes to the planet, and some even say that we 
have entered a novel geological era known as the Anthropocene. Many 
of the great problems we face, including the climate crisis, are now 
global. Not only is this a challenge to our biological moral dispositions, 
but also to our own political systems. In fact, Persson and Savulescu 
(2012:8, 83, 96) believe that liberal democracies are not sufficiently pre-
pared to adopt the necessary measures to mitigate phenomena such as 
global warming. Indeed, the difficulty faced by liberal democracies is that 
of in imposing policies that might prove unpopular by requiring sacri-
fices from individuals. However, the proposal of Persson and Savulescu 
is not to abandon liberal democracies, but to claim the urgent need for 
an enhancement of human morality in order to coordinate an effective 
response to issues such as climate change. That is to say, they propose the 
necessity of a Moral Bio-Enhancement (MBE) program.
Persson and Savulescu (2012:124) argue that MBE should be accom-
panied by traditional moral education and appropriate institutional and 
social reforms. They consider that the successes of the latter have been 
too moderate in face of the seriousness of the threat, so relying on them 
as the only solutions is discouraged. That is precisely why they believe 
that MBE is necessary, because neither traditional moral education, nor 
informing citizens about the unsustainability of the current levels of re-
source consumption, nor sociopolitical reforms might suffice. In no way 
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do they believe that enhancement is the definitive solution, since they 
recognize that the real possibilities of intervention are still minimal. They 
do stress that research lines aimed at studying both the limitations of hu-
man moral nature and the possible improvement of such dispositions 
should be prioritized, as in order to deal with these phenomena of colos-
sal magnitude, the biological basis of morality should be influenced by all 
available means, either traditional means such as education, or cutting-edge 
biomedical interventions (2012:133).
Now, which is one of the great impediments that prevent us from 
mitigating climate change? According to Persson and Savulescu, motiva-
tion is one of the dispositions that are not being sufficiently successful, so 
it is worth assessing the possibility of enhancing it through biotechno-
logical methods, since “[w]e need to be motivated to a greater degree” 
(2012:9). They start from the premise that we have enough information 
on how to combat climate change, but we are not showing the necessary 
will to carry out the appropriate actions.1 This leads us to a classic ques-
tion in moral philosophy: akrasia, the abyss between knowing the good 
and doing the good that we have known since at least Socrates (Harris, 
2016). 
The weakness of will of human beings has gained a reinforced dimen-
sion with the current environmental challenge. Persson and Savulescu 
(2012) point out that there is a general scientific consensus that climate 
change has an anthropogenic origin, mostly caused by the accumulation 
of greenhouse gases (namely carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, etc.) 
in the atmosphere that have been emitted by human activity (see Doran 
& Zimmerman, 2009).2 Although we know, then, what the origins of 
the problem are, as well as some possible solutions, we are not taking the 
necessary measures to mitigate it. Some of the questions, therefore, involve 
how to deal more consciously with both positive responsibility (respon-
sibility for the consequences of our actions) and negative responsibility 
(responsibility for the consequences of our omissions) and how to foster 
moral motivation to do what we are already convinced that we must do 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2012:123). If the Tragedy of the Commons did 
1 As Kulawska and Hauskeller (2018:376) stated, “[t]he problem, then, is not that 
we don’t know what to do, but, rather that we do not do it.”
2 However, it is important to note that at a population level the scientific consen-
sus itself is not a guarantee of shaping behavior if there is not a widely public perception 
of it. See Lewandowsky et al. (2013).
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not have a technological solution, but required a fundamental extension 
of morality, especially through mutual coercion (Hardin, 1968), the 
tragedy of climate change in our shared world could be faced through an 
extension of “the horizons of our moral conscience” helped by biotech-
nologies (Persson & Savulescu, 2012:103). Persson and Savulescu’s MBE 
proposal has sparked a very interesting theoretical debate.
2.  MORAL BIOENHANCEMENT: A DAUNTING DEBATE?
Throughout the history of humanity, we have always tried to improve 
morality by traditional methods, such as education, law, social rules, re-
ligion, punishment, literature, etc. Recently, some seminal publications 
pointed out to the possibility of considering biotechnological means to 
improve human moral behavior (Douglas, 2008; Persson & Savulescu, 
2008; Faust, 2008). These papers opened up the debate on so-called 
moral bioenhancement or, simply, moral enhancement.3 In this second 
section, I will briefly show some of the main controversies raised in this 
academic literature. 
One of the facts that makes MBE a puzzling debate is that some of 
the champions of human enhancement have been suspicious about it, 
such as John Harris (2011, 2013, 2016) and Nick Agar (2010, 2015). In 
addition, rivers of ink flowed in regard to the discussion of whether 
moral enhancement could lead to a curtailment of human freedom.4 But 
for the aims of this article it is more important to note that the debate 
has shown that there is wide disagreement about what a genuine moral 
enhancement would be. The great controversy is what the moral in 
3 Lately, various papers have addressed the possibility of using Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) to enhance ethical decision making. These proposals cannot be considered 
cases of moral bioenhancement, but instead they are part of a broader discussion on 
moral enhancement. See, for instance, Whitby (2011), Savulescu & Maslen (2015), 
Klincewizc (2016), Giubilini & Savulescu (2017) and Lara & Deckers (2019).
4 This is one of the topics that has been more extensively covered in the literature, 
but I think that it is not strictly necessary for the sake of my argument. In case of 
interest, see Douglas (2008: 479-480), Harris (2011), Pacholczyck (2011:272-6), 
Persson & Savulescu (2012:114 et seq.), Savulescu & Persson (2012), DeGrazia 
(2013), Persson & Savulescu (2013), Douglas (2013), Rakić (2014:247-8), Douglas 
(2014), Harris (2016), Earp et al. (2018:176-7), Glannon (2018), Diéguez & Véliz 
(2019), and Persson & Savulescu (2019a:9).
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moral enhancement discussion actually means. As Raus et al. (2014:264) 
perfectly pointed out: “behind the seeming neutrality of the defining the 
concept, there often lie philosophical battles as to what constitutes moral-
ity and what it means to act morally”, that is, there is an evident tension 
between the descriptive and the normative dimensions of the concept. 
Following Pacholczyck (2011:253), Earp, Douglas and Savulescu gave 
the subsequent definition of moral enhancement:
[A] moral enhancement is a beneficial change in moral functioning. Here 
the idea is, first, to identify an underlying psychological or neurological function 
that is involved in moral reasoning, decision making, acting, and so forth (that 
is what makes the function “moral”, a descriptive claim) and then to intervene 
in it “beneficially” (a normative claim). But “beneficially” could mean different 
things, depending on one’s normative perspective. (Earp et al., 2018:168, ital-
ics in the original source).
Having said that, the initial disputes of the debate have been related 
to what moral dispositions should be enhanced. At first, the proposals of 
Persson and Savulescu (2008, 2012) and Douglas (2008, 2013) focused 
on capacities close to the emotional dimension such as empathy, sympa-
thy, altruism, the sense of justice, trust and motivation. Following Kudlek 
(2019), these MBE supporters have focused on the direct modulation of 
certain affective dispositions, which has been a remarkable source of 
discussion. 
Initially, Persson and Savulescu (2008:168-172; 2012:108) pointed 
out that altruism and the sense of justice are the goals that should be en-
hanced through MBE to increase motivation and cooperation. Both are, 
according to the authors, the “core of our moral dispositions” and both 
have a biological basis to be able to propose interventions by biotechno-
logical means. More recently, there has also been talk about “first order 
moral emotions or capacities” (Earp et al., 2018:174), which would in-
clude “basic features of our psychology that are relevant to moral motiva-
tions and behavior, such as empathy and a sense of fairness” (Earp et al., 
2018:178). 
Moreover, Douglas defended a direct emotion modulation as a kind 
of “noncognitive moral enhancement” (Douglas, 2013:162). He thinks 
that “it seems clear that what is necessary for moral enhancement is the 
fine tuning of certain emotions in a person-specific way that is sensitive 
to prevailing circumstances” (Douglas, 2013:166, italics in the original 
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source). Douglas (2008, 2013) also suggested that one of the objectives 
of MBE could be not only fostering certain emotions but also reducing 
counter-moral emotions, among which he placed racial aversions and 
impulses towards violent aggressions.
John Harris (2011, 2013, 2016) has been one of the most notable 
critics of the newly presented conceptions of MBE. For Harris, to act 
morally is to act for the best “all things considered” (2016:4). According 
to him, increasing prosociability or decreasing violent behavior does not 
improve the ability of agents to consider all aspects, nor does it improve 
moral judgments or change them (Harris, 2016:83-4). Stimulating emo-
tions does not provide rules, neither principles, nor moral content. 
However, the idea of MBE does not seem bad to him per se and he defends 
that it would be more useful to implement a cognitive enhancement that 
would increase our ability to think ethically, since he affirms that it is 
precisely when moral emotions fail that moral reasoning becomes most 
necessary (2016:112).5
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Persson and Savulescu do 
not deny that cognitive enhancement may be indispensable for MBE, but 
“finding out what we are justified in believing to be morally right does 
not automatically make us act accordingly”. (Persson & Savulescu, 
2008:173). Internalizing moral doctrines and improving the ability to 
reason does not seem to be enough for them. In fact, not even a phenom-
enon such as the Flynn Effect (which shows an increase in IQ scores in 
recent decades) can reverse the short-term tendency and other limitations 
of our evolutionarily forged myopic moral psychology (Persson & Sa-
vulescu, 2012). The authors’ proposal demands taking into account both 
the reasons that force us to act morally and the indispensable motivation 
to put them into practice, although it is true that they put the emphasis 
on this last provision because they believe that it is the one that needs to 
be reinforced the most (Rakić, 2014; Persson & Savulescu, 2015b:350, 
2019c).
Nonetheless, the criticisms that have arisen have shifted the focus of 
some of the new proposals towards aspects more linked to rationality. 
Schaefer and Savulescu (2019) have proposed a “procedural moral en-
hancement” that seeks to improve deliberations in order to arrive to 
5 One of Sparrow’s criticisms (2014a:25) went in the same direction: “[e]nhancing 
an individual’s moral agency would therefore require more than simply reshaping their 
inclinations — it would require improving their capacity to act for the right reasons.”
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principles and thus improve the decision-making of individual agents. 
They have highlighted six factors related to moral reasoning that would 
be the objectives to promote the reliability of agents, i.e., logical compe-
tence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness to revi-
sion and the search for possible faults in one’s own reasons, empathic 
understanding, and avoidance of bias (Schaefer & Savulescu, 2019). In 
the same line, Earp et al. (2018:171 et seq.) have defended that there are 
strong reasons to pursue a MBE program that enhances the reasoning 
process itself, since improving rational deliberation increases the probabil-
ity of arriving at moral beliefs and better decisions and, consequently, 
producing better actions, or what is the same, more moral actions (Earp 
et al., 2018:172).
Consequently, it could be said that a genuine moral enhancement that 
seeks to avoid some of the previous problems should stress the emo-
tional, the cognitive and the motivational dimensions of morality.6 
However, this is something that is too distant to be accomplished by the 
current state of the art of moral enhancement technologies.
Sparrow (2014b:27) stated that “[t]he debate about moral bioenhance-
ment is a strange affair by virtue of being so far ahead of the science that 
it presumes.” Actually, it is dubious that there has been such presumption. 
From the very beginning, it has been acknowledged that there is a “pal-
try research effort” and a limited knowledge to biomedically influence 
moral behavior (Persson & Savulescu, 2008:172) and that the technical 
feasibility of these types of interventions is plausible only in the medium-
term future (Douglas, 2008:242). Certainly, moral enhancement science 
is still in its infancy (Persson & Savulescu, 2012:11; Crockett, 2014:370). 
On the one hand, there have been remarkable advances in the interdis-
ciplinary scientific approaches underpinning the biological, psychological, 
genetic and neurological foundations of morality. More so than ever 
before, we are aware of some important predispositions, limitations and 
biases of our evolutionary forged moral psychology. However, the sci-
ence of morality is considerably limited, as are the methods for interven-
ing in it. 
Most of the debate has been concentrated on currently available “sexy 
drugs” (Sparrow, 2014a:25) or “rudimentary” methods (Handfield et 
al., 2016:742), such as the administration of oxytocin, serotonin (espe-
cially, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors), propranolol, methylphe-
6 DeGrazia (2014) offered a complete formula of MBE including those dimensions. 
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nidate, etc. All of them offer some advantages and drawbacks in terms of 
their impact on human psychology.7 Nonetheless, it is highly probable 
that the pharmaceutical and biotechnological methods to modulate 
moral behavior will continue growing inasmuch as the scientific knowl-
edge about the biological foundations of human morality keeps increasing 
steadily. 
3.  THE ULTIMATE MOSTROPIC: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
FOR THE MORAL BIOENHANCEMENT PROGRAM
And there’s always soma to calm your anger, to reconcile you to your enemies, to 
make you patient and long-suffering. In the past you could only accomplish these things 
by making a great effort and after years of hard moral training. Now, you swallow two 
or three half-gramme tablets, and there you are. Anybody can be virtuous now. You 
can carry at least half your morality about in a bottle. (Huxley, 1932/1977: 235). 
The novel Brave New World is an inexhaustible source of references 
for the human enhancement debate. Yet some quotes needs to be care-
fully invoked, as in this case. In the book, soma is not a drug that helps 
people to face the problems of reality, but to escape from them, to get 
away from that dystopian scenario in which the inhabitants of Brave 
New World live.8 Here I am borrowing the idea of a completely ex-
tended drug that has a powerful impact on our moral dispositions, but 
not intending to take us away from our social reality, but rather to make 
us stronger agents to deal with its problems. A good soma would help us 
not to only rely on “hard moral training” and to carry “at least half your 
morality” in a pocket. Let us imagine that we have already discovered 
the Ultimate Mostropic9 (UM).
7 See, for instance, Persson & Savulescu (2008, 2012), Crockett (2014), Levy et 
al. (2014), Rakić (2017), Lara (2017a), and Terbeck & Francis (2018).
8 John Harris (2016:49) pointed out that the positive connotations that the expres-
sion “brave new world” had in Miranda’s mouth in Shakespeare’s The Tempest becomes 
strongly negative in Huxley’s work.
9 The term ‘mostropic’ was coined by Phil Torres (2017:691), following the 
model of nootropic. While a nootropic is used to refer to a pill that fosters cognitive 
abilities (also known as smart drugs), a mostropic would be a pill that improves 
moral abilities. The term ‘nootropic’ was coined by Corneliu E. Giurgea (1972). See 
also Giurgea (1982).
Ramon Llull Journal_11.indd   285 4/5/20   13:58
286 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2020. ISSUE 11 PP. 277-303
The UM thought experiment is based on the most optimistic possible 
scenario. I am supposing that we rank (by major social agreement or by 
a secret plan of the governments) the MBE program at the top of our 
research investments. Thus, it would have high priority in the resource 
allocation strategy, having more urgency than other competing important 
scientific research lines such as cancer therapy, AI, life-extending treat-
ments, etc. I also presume that in a few years we will discover a drug for 
the MBE program and that we will do it in time to mitigate the most 
deleterious effects of climate change. The UM pill has passed all the nec-
essary human trials and is already available for widespread consumption. 
Furthermore, it is extremely cheap and completely safe (without un-
wanted off target consequences and without secondary health risks). The 
uptake of a UM pill would enhance cognitive, emotional and motiva-
tional abilities related to moral behavior far beyond what is normal in 
members of the human species. Moreover, the advances in personalized 
and precision medicine would provide that everyone reaches at least a 
minimum of moral capacities that is considerably superior to those that 
any normal human could statistically have.10 In order to avoid concerns 
about over-medicalization, let’s suppose, for instance, that one pill per 
week would be enough to meet this goal. 
This thought experiment has an undeniable advantage:11 it allows us 
to think more plainly about the most important scenarios to distribute 
the UM. I distinguish two main settings in which the MBE program 
could be undertaken: (a) a compulsory universal MBE strategy, and (b) 
a voluntary intake of the UM. In this second case, the program would 
not be obligatory and would rely on the decisions made by individuals 
for their own sake.12 I will try to show that both pathways have enough 
10 This way could serve to overcome the justified skepticism of Sparrow (2014b:23), 
who said that there is no guarantee due to natural human variation that the same bio-
technological intervention would generate the same response at a population level. See 
also Pacholczyck (2011:260). 
11 Here I align with the pragmatic optimism of Agar (2004), who defended that 
imagining that enhancement technologies were already available and safe would allow 
us to think more clearly about their ethical encouragement or dissuasion. 
12 Moreover, there have been specific proposals of moral enhancement through 
genetic engineering or Genetic Preimplantation Diagnosis. See, for instance, Faust 
(2008), Walker (2009) and Douglas & Devolder (2013). In these cases, which I am 
not considering here, the decision for moral enhancement would be made by the 
prospective parents, with the exception of Walker, who also considered state promo-
tion.
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serious defects to make us not to be over-enthusiastic regarding MBE as 
a method to mitigate climate change.
A)  STATE-DRIVEN, UNIVERSAL AND MANDATORY MBE PROGRAM
Persson and Savulescu do not offer any systematic account of the chal-
lenge of implementing MBE, because they think that “it’s premature to 
spend much time on such speculations, since we’re so far from being in 
possession of safe and effective forms of biomedical moral enhancement” 
(2019c, unprefixed page). As a result, in Unfit they do not address di-
rectly whether MBE should be compulsory or voluntary (see 2012, 
2014b:251; Rakić, 2014:247; Schlag, 2019). They have only done spo-
radic references to these issues in different works.13 Their policy recom-
mendation is rather that we should rank MBE at the top of our research 
investments. However, I think that it is more sensible to foresee the 
possible impediments of both application pathways before embarking on 
any research of a mostropic for mass-consumption. 
The first possibility that I am going to explore is that of a universal 
compulsory plan that would apply to all citizens, which was their initial 
suggestion, as it can be seen in the following fragment:
If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to 
believe that their use should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in water, 
since those who should take them are least likely to be inclined to use them. 
That is, safe, effective moral enhancement would be compulsory. (Persson y 
Savulescu, 2008:174).
According to Persson and Savulescu (2008; 2015b), MBE is so neces-
sary and so urgent that it could be justified to extend it to a population 
level. Persson and Savulescu are aware of how difficult it would be to 
implement a global MBE program, but this does not discourage them 
13 For instance, it seems clear that they defend that MBE should be compulsory 
for children (2012:113; 2015b:351; 2019c).
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from defending a hypothetical moral obligation of the project. 
Obviously, just because something is compulsory for the whole 
population does not mean that it has to be morally reprehensible. Com-
pleting primary and secondary education, paying taxes or respecting the 
traffic rules are practices that all citizens have to comply with in many 
countries. Moreover, these obligations can be considered morally desir-
able. Nevertheless, doubts arise from this kind of project. I am going to 
point out three important shortcomings of, following Glannon’s termi-
nology (2018:80), a “state-sponsored compulsory enhancement”. Firstly, 
in liberal democracies it is likely that there would be serious difficulties 
in accepting it. Secondly, several control mechanisms should be developed 
in order to ensure that the plan is successfully accomplished. Thirdly, it 
would be extremely burdensome to put a global MBE program into 
practice, despite the exceptionally low price of the UM. 
Persson and Savulescu (2012) recognize that implementing MBE at a 
massive scale would be much easier in societies with authoritarian or 
dictatorial regimes than in democratic governments, although this does 
not seem to them to make such political systems more acceptable. Ac-
cording to them, MBE could be a way of preserving liberal democracies. 
I think that this idea is problematic. An abrupt and mandatory MBE 
program is very likely to be rejected by a considerable fraction of the 
citizenry of democratic societies. Moreover, it is an issue that should be 
discussed publicly and democratically, passing through the filters of discus-
sion, deliberation and adoption characteristic of these models of govern-
ment. Yet MBE supporters might argue that this new restriction of 
freedoms could be imposed from contractualist positions.
Tvrtko Jolić (2014) has reflected that a universal MBE program for 
all citizens could be considered as a kind of “biological contract” (refor-
mulating the classical social contract) according to which obligatory 
moral enhancements are postulated to guarantee the security and sur-
vival of humanity on Earth. As in Hobbes’ social contract (1651), in 
which people renounce part of their sovereignty and freedom, transferring 
them to the State in exchange for security and peace, the biological contract 
would mean that citizens renounce to part of their sovereignty over some 
of their own biological characteristics in favor of the government and for 
practically the same reasons (Jolić, 2014:87). Walter Glannon (2018:76) 
also thinks that this type of MBE should have a social contract theory as 
a bedrock. Glannon states that there is an obvious conflict between indi-
vidual liberties and the collective interest of avoiding harm (the most 
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extreme harm being human extinction). Persson and Savulescu do not 
explicitly sustain a contractualist position in support of their proposal. 
What they do subscribe is the liberal principle, following Mill (1859), of 
restricting freedom in order to avoid harm to others and to guarantee 
security (Savulescu & Persson, 2012). 
However, problems could also arise even if there was a general accept-
ance of a new biological-social contract due to the prevailing need of MBE 
to combat climate change. Sparrow (2014a:29) stated that even if a uni-
versal MBE program were democratically approved by a majority, this 
could not be done without imposing it on the minority that rejects it. 
Moreover, I think that there could be cases of conscientious objection or 
even organized and widespread initiatives of civil disobedience that at-
tempted to reverse the incipient rule of UM consumption, as was the case 
in some countries with mandatory military service.14 
I am obviously considering these possibilities in a scenario in which 
MBE would be developed explicitly; in other words, that the program 
would be implemented publicly and by informing the citizens. But, 
conversely, there might be an alternative: carrying out a “hidden 
[moral] enhancement” (Kulawska & Hauskeller, 2018:386). Imagine 
that it could be done administering the UM formula in the water system, 
without changing the flavor of tap water, similar to what we do with 
fluoride. This moral enhancement without the citizens’ knowledge could 
overcome some of the problems I have just raised. Still, it is very pos-
sible that it would lead to the emergence of new ones. For instance, 
many people might be suspicious of a sudden change in their behavior, 
but also in that of their fellow citizens (Kulawska & Hauskeller, 2018). 
If the work colleague who always arrives in her gas-guzzling all-terrain 
vehicle were to start commuting by public transport, it would be at least 
a source of curiosity. Furthermore, it would pose a serious threat if the 
governing elite were the only one to know that a universal MBE program 
is being carried out. This would bring democratic systems closer to the 
authoritarian systems that Persson and Savulescu seek to avoid (Schlag, 
2019).15
14 This argument, nonetheless, is not very persuasive. It could be counter argued 
saying that even if minorities do not take the pill, the overall benefit would still remain 
clear. I thank this comment to David Rodríguez-Arias.
15 According to Schlag (2019), a worldwide secret MBE program would require 
a benevolent enhancer, whose acts beyond democratic control pose several problems.
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The second concern is related in some way to that latter problem. At 
the beginning of the MBE program, several mechanisms of control, along 
with coordination and cooperation networks, should be established at a 
state and supranational level. Global institutions should be created to 
guarantee that the plan is being accomplished in all the states of the world. 
Within the states, moreover, some monitoring should be implemented 
to ensure that all citizens are taking the UM regularly, that is, intensive 
surveillance would be an undisputable requirement. However, this 
raises the everlasting question of Juvenal, which Harris (2016:105) re-
membered: “Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?—But who guards the 
guardians?” Then, some kind of supervision of those who supervise 
(sousveillance) would be needed. As Glannon (2018:81) said: 
[T]here would remain the daunting task of enforcing compliance. This 
would require different levels of co-ordinated social and political action. It would 
also assume the moral integrity and public acceptance of those empowered with 
overseeing these tasks. This may assume too much.
Third, even if the UM were extremely cheap, the economic costs and 
the practical challenges for its distribution are discouraging. We do not 
currently have, and it seems like we are not going to in the near future, 
institutional mechanisms for the “widespread implementation” of the 
MBE program (Hanfield et al., 2016:742). Extending MBE to the world’s 
seven billion people seems frankly impossible (Kulawska & Hauskeller, 
2018:387), even more so if the population continues growing. In addition, 
John Harris (2016:137) cited the example of the eradication of the po-
liovirus by means of an extensive but not universal vaccination program, 
to signal the not very realistic prospect of a worldwide MBE program:
Even if the eventual moral enhancement could be applied as easily as via, 
for example, the oral administration of something on a sugar lump, we know 
from experience with the polio vaccine that it would be impossible to ensure 
anything like universal coverage. Moreover, unlike with vaccination, there will 
not be the benefits of ‘herd immunity’ to help mask deficits in coverage.
Overall, the universal and state-driven MBE program could create huge 
controversy in the political arena of liberal democracies, strenuous multi-
directional control mechanisms would be required and it seems to be ex-
tremely difficult, almost impossible, to put into practice in the near future.
Ramon Llull Journal_11.indd   290 4/5/20   13:58
291RUEDA
CLIMATE CHANGE, MORAL BIOENHANCEMENT
AND THE ULTIMATE MOSTROPIC
B)  MBE PROGRAM FOUNDED ON THE INITIATIVE  
OF VOLUNTARY INDIVIDUALS
The second possibility would be to allow this type of enhancement for 
individuals who decide to undergo it voluntarily, probably through the 
requirement of informed consent. The state could not only legalize the 
UM, but also promote it or offer it free of charge to the volunteers, if it 
were considered a public good.16 It has been said that a safe and voluntary 
MBE would not necessarily cause great controversy (Rakić, 2014, 
2017:292). Moreover, it has been claimed that adults who autonomously 
undergo such interventions act with even greater freedom than children 
and young people who receive moral learning in traditional formal educa-
tion (Lara, 2017b:173). I think that voluntariness makes MBE only prima 
facie non-controversial in this case. Although I consider that this second 
option would have more ethical acceptability than the universal and com-
pulsory program, there are some aspects than can also be unfavorable. 
My first doubt is whether a voluntary MBE program would be a suc-
cessful strategy to encourage people to improve their moral behavior in 
relation to climate change. The potential public that could demand these 
interventions is uncertain. For some, it would be paradoxical that people 
who consider that they need MBE (because they are not motivated enough 
to act morally) are yet motivated to undergo this type of program (Cor-
tina, 2013). For others, this is not necessarily paradoxical (Lara, 2017b; 
Persson & Savulescu, 2019c). After all, we already consume products 
that help us to accomplish what we are convinced we want to do, such 
as when we have a few glasses of wine to get closer to dance with the 
person we are attracted to.
Nevertheless, in order to estimate the demand, it should be taken into 
account whether there is a reluctance to change the so-considered core 
features of identity, among which moral dispositions are commonly 
placed. Jason Riis, Joseph P. Simmons and Geoffrey P. Goodwin (2008) 
carried out a very revealing study on the preferences of people regarding 
different types of psychological enhancement, disclosing a major ten-
dency to reject improvements in what are considered fundamental char-
acteristics of personal identity.17 The authors suggested that the volun-
16 See Rakić (2014:249) for different stimuli to publicly encourage voluntary MBE. 
17 See DeGrazia (2005) and Brey (2009) to read different perspectives on the 
topic of human enhancement and identity. 
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tariness of these interventions is conditioned by beliefs about whether or 
not the features to be promoted are relevant personality traits (Riis et al., 
2008:495). The mental traits linked to emotion were considered by 
people as aspects deeply rooted in their own identity and whose modifi-
cation causes greater reticence, also due to the tendency to want to preserve 
their own personal identity (Riis et al., 2008:497). Empathy and motiva-
tion, for instance, were among the dispositions that people were less 
likely to enhance, as opposed, for example, to mathematical ability or the 
ability to learn foreign languages (Riis et al., 2008:499).18 
The UM would undoubtedly enhance psychological characteristics 
that are closely related to personal identity. Yet it would also enhance 
other traits that are not necessarily so connected to it, which might be an 
important trade-off. It is possible that the other important enhancements19 
that the UM would provide could compensate for the potential change 
of identity in a lot of people. Thus, the empirical results of the previous 
study must be taken much more cautiously. The factors that determine 
the demand would be more uncertain in this speculative scenario.
That being said, the concern is common in the literature that the most 
reluctant people to MBE would likely be those who need it the most 
(Persson y Savulescu, 2008, 2012, 2015b; Harris, 2016; Torres, 2017). 
Therefore, it is difficult to assume that those with less developed moral 
abilities20 are likely to undergo MBE procedures. John Harris’s slogan 
18 This should not be taken as a reason to refute the permissibility of making such 
modifications; rather, it should be taken into account as a factor to foresee a possible 
low demand. The authors, in fact, point out that while people were reluctant to 
modify features that altered their identity, they did not object to others doing so (Riis 
et al., 2008:502). They also suggested that this concern about identity could be dimin-
ished by advertisements and marketing messages (Riis et al., 2008:503-4).
19 This would be the case if the UM constituted a sort of “general-purpose device” 
(Schlag, 2019).
20 Raus et al. (2014:266 et seq.) rightly stated that determining what constitutes an 
average or normal level of moral functioning is an extremely complex issue that would 
ultimately lead to normative justifications. In the same way, they postulated a prob-
lematic distinction between moral therapy and moral enhancement due to individual 
diversity that could create three types of interventions. Intervention X would take a 
subject with dysfunctional moral capacities or below average to the normal level, which 
would be considered a moral therapy. Intervention Y would take a subject with normal 
moral abilities to a higher level than the average, which would constitute a moral en-
hancement. Finally, intervention Z would move a subject with lower than average 
moral capacities to a lever higher than normal, which would include both aspects of 
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“ethics is for bad guys” (2016) shows that those who need ethics the most 
are also those who reject them the most. If the primary goal of the UM 
is to enhance moral behavior, it is rather improbable that the “bad guys” 
will feel attracted to consume it. Furthermore, in connection with the 
climate emergency, it is plausible that only the people who are aware of 
this urgent challenge would request it (Kulawska & Hauskeller, 2018:386). 
In view of this, a provisional conclusion could be that voluntary MBE 
would be permissible, but that at a strategic level it is very unlikely that 
it would be effective to mitigate global warming. As Sparrow (2014b:21) 
suggested: “it seems unlikely that enough people—and the right people—
would voluntarily undergo moral bioenhancement such that this would 
be sufficient to reduce the risk of climate change.” However, there is 
another important precaution that can even discourage the ethical permis-
sibility of voluntary MBE. 
The last problem of this second distribution scenario is related to the 
emergence of the free rider figure. In order to tackle the environmental 
crisis, it is undeniable that cooperation rates should be increased, but do-
ing it through MBE could increase the number of people who would take 
advantage of this enterprise for their own self-interest (Glannon, 2018:78 
et seq.). Those who are not willing to take the UM could reinforce their 
competitive and selfish goals at the expense of the people who will engage 
voluntarily in the MBE program. The free rider in the context of the 
climate crisis would think that others will do what he/she has to do to 
mitigate global warming. In addition, he/she could malignly take advan-
tage of the increase of general cooperation due to the amount of morally 
enhanced people. It has been said that this risk is even more significant if 
MBE were to mainly foster elementary prosocial dispositions (namely, 
the tendency to trust, altruism and helping motivation towards others), 
for instance, using oxytocin (Lara, 2017a). In Handfield et al.’s opinion 
(2016:744), increasing “elementary prosocial dispositions will not trans-
late into a reliably increased rate of cooperation. It will instead be an 
environment that is congenial for infiltration by exploitative, uncoop-
therapy and enhancement. The authors pointed out that these differentiations make 
the MBE debate even more difficult and that this type of approach ends up collater-
ally raising the question of what types of deficiencies should be medicalized (Raus et 
al. 2014:267). According to my previous characterization, the UM would produce 
interventions Y and Z. See also Agar (2010).
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erative agents.” Therefore, from a consequentialist viewpoint, the spread 
of the free rider figure would be totally undesirable. 
Consequently, the free rider problem should neither be underesti-
mated, nor overestimated. In this thought experiment, the UM would 
also enhance moral abilities that are not only elementary social dispositions. 
Some could argue that the cognitive enhancement provided by the regular 
consumption of this drug might counterbalance these prospective perils, 
enabling morally enhanced people to detect when free riders are unfairly 
taking advantage of them. Moreover, the social and external coaction 
against those who behave dishonestly for their own selfish welfare could 
dissuade the cheaters from adopting dangerous courses of action for soci-
ety and the planet. In fact, this is something that we already try to do. 
The State could also strengthen penalties in the most serious cases and 
new laws could be created to typify new crimes and offenses. In addition, 
to think that morally enhanced people would be “meek” or “compliant”, 
or easier to exploit or to deceive, is an untenable prejudice (see Walker, 
2009:42-3). In our case, therefore, the free rider problem would not be-
come a definitive reason to deny the ethical permissibility of a voluntary 
MBE program. It would rather make us more wary about the potential 
risks of exploitation, corruption and abuse in this second setting.
Summarizing, both distribution methods of the UM have relevant 
shortcomings. As Kulawska and Hauskeller (2018:387) said in relation 
to MBE: “[i]t is both problematic to enhance only some people and to 
enhance everyone.” Between the two, the weakest is the worldwide and 
compulsory program, which is almost impracticable and would lead to 
substantial public controversies at least in the first stages of the develop-
ment. The second one is not ethically undesirable, although it could 
create some unwanted but uncertain evil consequences if the figure of the 
free rider were significantly extended. Actually, what is likely about the 
voluntary MBE program is that those who need to enhance their impact-
ing behavior on the climate catastrophe would probably be the most 
reluctant to take the UM.
4.  (MIS)ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, POLITICAL  
(IN)ACTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE (IM)POLICIES
One complex problem of tackling climate change is the attribution of 
responsibilities. There is no scientific doubt that global warming has an 
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anthropogenic origin. This fact could be translated into sentences such as 
“humanity is responsible for climate change” or “human beings have 
created this phenomenon.” This could lead us to say that every human 
(or every member of the Homo sapiens species) is responsible for climate 
change. Yet this type of inference could be troublesome for an accurate 
attribution of responsibilities. 
On the one hand, it is undisputable that individual human behavior 
has consequences for global warming. Hence, it could be said that all of 
us are co-responsible for this phenomenon to different degrees. This fact 
is unfortunately undervalued and it should be stressed greatly to make 
people more aware of the accountability of their lifestyle in relation to 
the environmental crisis. On the other hand, however, it is undeniable 
that we are unequally responsible. There are people, companies and 
countries that contaminate more than others. Actually, there are a few 
companies (namely, the producers of fossil fuels) that have historically 
contaminated more than a lot of countries in the world, and continue to 
do so.21 Acknowledgement of the degree of responsibilities is therefore 
essential to hold the different agents accountable for their imbalanced 
contribution to climate change. 
Persson and Savulescu are aware of this fact. Actually, they pointed out 
that most of “the worst sinners” of climate change (in relation to the 
countries with the highest greenhouse gases emissions per capita) are also 
those who will not suffer the most devastating consequences of global 
warming (2010:665, 2011:493). Therefore, a universal and compulsory 
MBE program is less well-grounded if we pay adequate attention to the 
scale of responsibilities. Why should we enhance the morality of all humans 
if we are not equally responsible? Some might argue that those who should 
be morally enhanced are precisely those who contaminate the most, includ-
ing the people in wealthy countries, the executives of companies and the 
politicians of the governments that contribute to this hazardous phenom-
enon the most. Still, I think that this kind of reasoning could be misleading. 
Prioritizing the implementation of the MBE program on those who 
contaminate the most would only translate the formerly analyzed prob-
lems of both pathways of the UM into the novel plans. To only morally 
enhance the entire population of the countries that emit the largest num-
ber of greenhouse gases per capita (most of them liberal democracies) 
could cause fierce political controversies, would require profound intra- 
21 See Frumhoff et al. (2015) and Griffin (2017).
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and interstate control mechanisms and would still be incredibly eco-
nomically burdensome. It could also unfairly put these countries at an 
advantage or disadvantage in relation to the ones that would not be en-
hanced. There are also considerable differences in the lifestyles and eco-
logical footprints among citizens within affluent countries. In addition, 
if we do it only with the political leaders of those governments we can 
favor or disfavor the political opposition, which might be considered 
particularly relevant in democratic systems. If we do it only with execu-
tives of the most polluting companies, moreover, we could create partial 
(dis)advantages with their competing economic rivals. Thus, why is it 
important to achieve an appropriate attribution of responsibilities in rela-
tion to climate change?
Identifying the principal causal agents of global warming is crucial to 
lead and to coordinate political actions (i.e., actions directed by govern-
ments) against the climate emergency; that is, to require policies to dras-
tically reduce the untenable actions (and omissions) committed by them, 
without necessarily changing the agents themselves. Phil Torres (2017:692) 
had an insight into this: “there are two ways of mitigating agent-tool risks: 
intervene on the tool or intervene on the agent. Moral bioenhancement 
is an agent-oriented strategy for reducing existential risk because it attempts 
to modify agents.” I think that Persson and Savulescu have erroneously 
prioritized changes in the agents and not in the tools that create the risks. 
In the case of global warming, some of the perilous “tools” have been 
obvious for a long time (unsustainable industries, polluting factories, 
non-renewable energy, non-electric cars, traveling by plane, etc.), but 
others are less widely known to a lot of people (food of animal origin, 
the heating in households and hot water for daily showers, clothing, 
deforestation caused by the production of different commodities, etc.). 
Establishing the connection between each causal agent (individuals, com-
panies or governments) and the specific tools is not always easy. Still, it 
is important to acknowledge that the most important of them rely on 
social structures rather than on isolated individuals. Climate change is of 
course a moral problem for individuals, but it is primarily a political 
problem that should be addressed at a societal level.22 
22 Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) defended in a challenging paper that there are not 
individual moral obligations according to principles in relation to global warming. He 
stated that this massive scale problem primarily raises obligations for the governments 
(2005:312). I definitely agree with him on the latter point. 
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Surely, climate change raises several moral problems and partly because 
of that we expect that some ethical requirements meet the response that 
we give to it (Agar, 2015:345). But it is mostly a political challenge. Our 
social structures determine to a large extent the response that we can give 
to this phenomenon (Kulawska & Hauskeller, 2018:379). For instance, 
a person may be willing and morally motivated to buy an electric car, 
but she needs the urban environment to be conditioned to recharge it 
when the battery runs out. Moreover, if highly polluting cars are forbid-
den from driving into the center of large cities, at the same time it is 
necessary to complement this limitation of access with public policies that 
promote better and more economical public transport. John Harris 
(2016:144) already warned that it is insane to mainly address global 
problems that depend on social structures such as severe poverty or climate 
change at an individual level: “[i]n a real sense it is gross self-indulgence, 
not to mention self-defeating, to try to address these big problems at the 
level of individual morality.” Sparrow (2014a:29) has also been very 
critical with seeking the solutions to the world’s evils in MBE to the 
detriment of politically coordinated institutional enterprises: 
[T]here is little reason to believe that they could not be solved by addressing 
these structural issues while leaving human nature as it is now. Removing the 
institutional incentives that reward selfish behaviour and the pursuit of short-
term goals over long-term goals would do more to produce ‘more moral’ be-
haviour than any program of biomedical interventions. 
Not only does choosing to resort to moral enhancement to try to solve the 
world’s ills evince an implausible combination of technological utopianism, 
naïve sociobiology, and political pessimism, it would also be politically danger-
ous.
The point that I would like to stress here is that MBE programs (es-
pecially the universal and compulsory one) are enormously political, as I 
have tried to show in the third section. Paradoxically, the “political pes-
simism” blamed on them by Sparrow (in some way justified by their 
distrust in the effectiveness of liberal democracies and traditional policies) 
ends up needing a “political optimism”, because MBE programs would 
require exhaustive and far-reaching political actions in order to be ac-
complished. However, it seems that Persson and Savulescu’s suggestion 
is not just another policy proposal to mitigate climate change. Rather, 
MBE would constitute an attempt to guarantee the success of the rest of 
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the policies, a sort of condition of possibility for them. This is explicitly 
manifested in the following sentence: “[w]e have never thought that 
political action is unnecessary, but we believe that moral enhancement is 
necessary for accomplishing requisite political actions, for instance, to 
combat climate change” (Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:55). This shows a 
significant misgiving not only about human moral nature, but also about 
the institutional design needed for the mitigation of existential risks. 
Maybe some degree of suspicion about both of them could be reasonable, 
but not trusting the political power to enforce changes and capabilities of 
human beings to adapt to such variations at all could have a deleterious 
paralysing effect, including for embarking on MBE programs. 
5. CONCLUSION
The implementation account of MBE has been notoriously absent in 
the works of Persson and Savulescu. In this paper, the UM thought ex-
periment has allowed us to foresee that MBE in the best possible sce-
nario would not be suitable in either of the two main modes of application. 
The very interesting debate on MBE should not become a distracting 
factor from seeking the real (political) solutions that must be fostered to 
mitigate the climate emergency. The challenging proposals of Persson 
and Savulescu, nevertheless, should serve us to understand more pro-
foundly the limitations of our human morality and of our political sys-
tems.23 Their merit consists in forcing us to take more seriously the task 
of devising effective measures to diminish the environmental collapse and 
global warming. Finally, contemporary environmental problems have to 
be approached from realistic (often unpleasant) and already known solu-
tions. In the blatantly outrageous case of the climate catastrophe, we are 
leaving for tomorrow what we should have done yesterday. There is no 
time to lose.
23 Recently, Persson and Savulescu (2019b:37) have noted that if MBE were to 
lead to the end of the capitalist market economy in order to achieve global sustainabil-
ity, they have no reason to oppose it. 
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